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CLIMATE CHANGE AND TAX POLICY 
Christina K. Harper* 
Abstract: Scientific evidence suggests that man-made greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, especially carbon dioxide emissions, are a contributing 
factor to global climate change. This global climate change negatively im-
pacts our Earth and policymakers must implement climate change policies 
in an effort to decrease carbon emission and mitigate its negative impacts. 
This Article will analyze three options for regulating GHG emissions: tradi-
tional command-and-control regulation, tradable permit markets, and 
taxes. Following a detailed analysis of both the theoretical and practical 
arguments regarding carbon taxation and alternative emissions permit 
trading schemes, this Article concludes that carbon taxation is the superior 
method of reducing carbon emissions. 
Introduction 
 From the human perspective, global climate change will have net 
negative impacts.1 As such, policymakers must implement climate 
change policies to mitigate these impacts to our Earth. Environmental 
or green taxation is one tool available to policymakers. Tax has the 
effect of encouraging a broad range of entities, through price incen-
tives, to take measures to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs). The rati-
fication of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, which imposes specific limits 
on GHG emissions for thirty-six nations, has reinvigorated the dia-
logue about green taxation. 
 Countries with previously little or no green taxation in their na-
tional systems now look to the examples of Nordic nations, which 
have used taxation to curb pollution for decades. Countries commit-
ted to GHG reduction should also look to politically favorable emis-
sions trading schemes, such as those developed in the United States, 
and to other similar mechanisms available, to help meet Kyoto goals. 
Nevertheless, policy makers should not discount taxation on GHGs, 
especially on carbon dioxide, as a viable option. 
                                                                                                                      
* Christina K. Harper is in Morgan Lewis’s Business and Finance Practice. Ms. Harper 
received her LL.M. in commercial law from the University of Cambridge and her J.D. from 
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1 DIRK T.G. RÜBBELKE, International Climate Policy to Combat Global Warm-
ing: An Analysis of the Ancillary Benefits of Reducing Carbon Emissions 7 (2002). 
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 After discussing global climate change and the international re-
sponse to climate change, this Article will analyze three options for 
regulating GHG emissions: traditional command-and-control (CAC) 
regulation, tradable permit markets, and taxes. The Article will then 
offer a detailed analysis of both the theoretical and practical argu-
ments for and against carbon taxation and alternative emissions per-
mit trading schemes. Based on this analysis, the author concludes that 
carbon taxation is the superior method of carbon abatement. 
I. Global Climate Change 
A. Defining Global Warming, the Greenhouse Gas Effect, and Climate Change 
 In 1898, the Swedish Nobel Prize winning chemist Svante Ar-
rhenius first warned the world that carbon dioxide emissions could 
lead to a phenomenon called global warming.2 Today, the majority of 
scientists now believe global warming is not just a threat, but a reality. 
Global warming describes the theory that man-made increases in car-
bon dioxide and other GHGs have rapidly accelerated the “greenhouse 
gas effect,” resulting in the Earth’s surface warming at unnatural rates. 
 GHGs trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere. This greenhouse ef-
fect is essential to keeping the Earth’s surface warmer; a natural phe-
nomenon, it keeps the Earth’s surface 40°C warmer than it would be 
without the greenhouse effect.3 At its natural rate the greenhouse ef-
fect is vital to life,4 however, the Earth’s positive imbalance between 
GHG emissions and absorption through natural processes (e.g. pho-
tosynthesis) results in the continuing increase of GHGs in the atmos-
phere.5 Therefore, the greenhouse effect continues to strengthen and 
the Earth continues to warm. 
 Scientists warn that increasing global temperatures could have 
catastrophic consequences. As the U.S. National Academy of Scientists 
(NAS) describes, “the phrase ‘climate change’ is growing in preferred 
                                                                                                                      
2 United Nations, Combating Global Warming: The Climate Change Convention 
(1997), http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/sustdev/climate.htm [hereinafter United 
Nations 1997]. 
3 Eric Chaisson & Steve McMillan, Astronomy Today 175 (5th ed. 2005); Na-
tional Academy of Sciences (NAS), Understanding and Responding to Climate Change: 
Highlights of National Academies Report 2 (2005), http://dels.nas.edu/basc/ [hereinaf-
ter NAS]. 
4 NAS, supra note 3, at 2. 
5 Energy Information Administration, National Energy Information Center, 
Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, and Energy (2003), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ 
1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html [hereinafter EIA]. 
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use to ‘global warming’ because it helps convey that there are changes 
in addition to rising temperatures.”6 Specifically, the U.N. Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warns that “[f]uture changes 
in climate are expected to include additional warming, changes in pre-
cipitation patterns and amounts, sea-level rise, and changes in the fre-
quency and intensity of some extreme events.”7 According to the IPCC, 
among those Earth systems “expected” to be impacted are “ocean circu-
lation; sea level; the water cycle; carbon and nutrient cycles; air quality; 
the productivity and structure of natural ecosystems; the productivity of 
agricultural, grazing, and timber lands; and geographic distribution, 
behavior, abundance, and survival of plant and animal species, includ-
ing vectors and hosts of human disease.”8 
 Observational evidence suggests that climate change has already 
affected the Earth’s systems.9 Impacts include “changes in Arctic tem-
peratures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean 
salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather including 
droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of tropical 
cyclones.”10 
 Scientists have been able to suggest with some certainty just how 
much the Earth has warmed. According to NAS, a growing body of 
evidence indicates “that the [Earth’s] surface temperatures have risen 
about 1.4°F (0.7°C) since the early twentieth century.”11 Most alarm-
ing, however, is the contention of NAS that over seventy percent or 
“about 0.9°F (0.5°C) of this increase has occurred since 1978.”12 The 
sharp blade-like rise of GHGs in the atmosphere in the past three 
decades is known as the “hockey stick result.”13 
                                                                                                                      
6 See NAS, supra note 3, at 3. 
7 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Technical Summary: Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability 21 (2001), http://www.grida.no/Newsroom.aspx?m=54 
&pressReleaseItemID=1050. 
8 Id. 
9 See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 
2007: The Physical Science Basis (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07. 
pdf. 
10 Id. at 8. 
11 NAS, supra note 3, at 1. 
12 Id. at 2. 
13 Antonio Regalado, Global-Warming Papers Question Skeptics’ Results, Wall Street 
Journal, Oct. 26, 2005, at B3. The hockey stick result “prominently featured in a 2001 
United Nations report.” Id. 
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B. Human Activities Raising Levels of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) 
 Scientists seem to agree that the Earth’s temperature is always 
changing; however, for the majority, the “key question is how much of 
the observed warming is due to human activities.”14 Some GHGs occur 
naturally in the atmosphere, while others result exclusively from hu-
man activities. Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
and sulfur hexafluoride are among the class of GHGs generated exclu-
sively through human industrial processes.15 
 In contrast, carbon dioxide (CO2 or carbon), methane (CH4), and 
nitrous oxide (N2O) are naturally occurring GHGs, although certain 
human activities add to the levels of these naturally occurring gases.16 
For instance, methane is emitted from “the decomposition of organic 
wastes in municipal solid waste landfills, and the raising of livestock” as 
well as during the “production and transport of coal, natural gas, and 
oil.”17 Similarly, nitrous oxide is emitted during agricultural activities 
such as raising livestock, paddy rice farming, and wetland changes, as 
well as during industrial activities including the combustion of solid 
waste and fossil fuels.18 Thus, scientists urge a move to clean renewable 
energies, such as wind, solar, bioenergy, and hydroelectric as a means to 
curbing GHG emissions.19 
C. Why Carbon Dioxide Emissions are of Particular Concern 
 While man-made increases in methane, nitrous oxide, and other 
GHGs are dangerous to the Earth’s delicate balance, most scientists 
agree that carbon dioxide emissions are the primary concern. Carbon 
dioxide is released into the atmosphere through deforestation and 
through the burning of solid waste and fossil fuels, specifically oil, natu-
ral gas, and coal.20 While natural processes, such as plant photosynthe-
sis, can absorb “some of the net 6.1 billion metric tons of carbon diox-
ide emissions produced each year (measured in carbon equivalent 
terms), an estimated 3.2 billion metric tons is added to the atmosphere 
                                                                                                                      
14 NAS, supra note 3, at 2. 
15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Climate Change—Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/index.html#ggo (last visited Mar. 28, 
2007) [hereinafter EPA Greenhouse Gas Emissions]. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 See Greenpeace International, Solutions, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/ 
campaigns/climate-change/solutions (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). 
20 EPA Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 15. 
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annually.”21 As a result, the Earth’s “carbon cycle” results in an enor-
mous imbalance.22 Some studies suggest that concentrations of carbon 
dioxide have risen thirty percent since the Industrial Revolution.23 In 
the United States, for instance, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions 
represent eighty-two percent of total U.S. man-made GHG emissions.24 
Thus, carbon dioxide is often referred to as the most critical GHG be-
cause of the unparalleled quantities produced by humans each year. 
D. Skeptics of Climate Change 
 A small minority of scientists reject current climate change warn-
ings as “alarmist.”25 For instance, Dr. S. Fred Singer of George Mason 
University argues, “[c]limate keeps changing all the time. The fact 
that climate changes is not in itself a threat, because, obviously, in the 
past human beings have adapted to all kinds of climate changes.”26 
Dr. Singer is not alone. Other scientists express similar views that 
natural climate variability is not currently well understood, and that 
this variability may be greater than once thought.27 As such, the mi-
nority caution that “[t]emperature extrapolations of the past are not 
precise enough to make dire conclusions about ‘normal’ warming.”28 
 The minority have also dismissed computer models used by the 
United Nations and other organizations as “oversimplifications that 
cannot simulate the complexities of the real climate.”29 For instance, a 
group of U.K. and U.S. scientists published a report in 2002 conclud-
ing that “[t]he IPCC simulation of surface temperature appears to be 
more a fortuitous case of curve fitting than a demonstration of hu-
man influence on the global climate.”30 Similarly, Canadians Stephen 
                                                                                                                      
21 EIA, supra note 5. 
22 Id. (explaining that carbon cycle is natural collective processes by which concentra-
tions of carbon dioxide in atmosphere are regulated). 
23 Michael Coren, The Science Debate Behind Climate Change, CNN.com, Feb. 10, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/science/04/08/earth.science/index.html. 
24 EIA, supra note 5. 
25 Coren, supra note 23. 
26 Frontline, What’s Up with the Weather? Interview: S. Fred Singer, April 2000, http://www. 
pbs.org/wgbh/warming/debate/singer.html. 
27 Coren, supra note 23. 
28 Id. See generally Marcel Leroux, Global Warming—Myth or Reality?: The Err-
ing Ways of Climatology (2005); Michael L. Parsons, Global Warming: The Truth 
Behind the Myth (1995). 
29 Coren, supra note 23. 
30 James Schlesinger & Robert Sproull, George C. Marshall Institute, Climate 
Science and Policy: Making the Connection 19 (2001), available at http://www.mar- 
shall.org/article.php?id=86. 
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McIntyre and Ross McKirtrick published a scientific study suggesting 
mathematical errors in the hockey stick result.31 Finally, some scien-
tists believe the media and certain politicians promulgate unnecessary 
fears of dire global consequences.32 
II. International Response to Climate Change 
A. 1980s and1990s Intergovernmental Conventions on Climate Change 
 The United Nations reacted to the growing scientific evidence of 
the harmful effects of GHGs by forming the IPCC in 1988. However, 
IPCC’s purpose was limited. The Panel was charged only with collect-
ing further data on the implications of climate change. It was three 
years later, with the formation of the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC or Rio Convention on Climate Change), 
that real progress began.33 The aim of the UNFCCC was to establish 
an actual process for responding to climate change over the next sev-
eral decades. Along with devising more precise measures for collect-
ing data, industrial nations agreed to “promote the transfer of fund-
ing and technology to help developing countries respond to climate 
change.”34 In total, 186 countries ratified the convention, all agreeing 
to “mitigate” GHG emissions.35 
 Countries also agreed that their plans for tackling GHGs would 
incorporate “principles of ‘common but differentiated responsibili-
ties’ according to economic and political situations.”36 As such, of the 
signatories, just twenty-four industrial nations specifically committed 
to take measures to ensure their GHG emissions in 2000 would not 
exceed their 1990 levels.37 Though the UNFCCC was characterized as 
                                                                                                                      
31 Stephen McIntyre & Ross McKitrick, Corrections to the Mann et al. (1998) Proxy Data-
base and Northern Hemisphere Average Temperature Series, in 14 Energy and Environment 
751, 751–72 (2003); see also Bush Firm over Kyoto Stance, CNN.com, Mar. 9, 2001, http:// 
archives.cnn.com/2001/US/03/29/schroeder.bush/ [hereinafter CNN (Mar. 9)]. 
32 Coren, supra note 23 (Richard Lindzen, a respected meteorologist from the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, notes that “scientists make meaningless or ambiguous 
statements. Advocates and media translate statements into alarmist declarations. Politi-
cians respond to alarm by feeding scientists more money.”). 
33 Earth Summit 2002, The Rio Conventions Committing Toward Sustainability 1, 
4 (2002), http://Earthsummit2002.Org/Es/Issues/Conventions/Rioconventions.pdf [here-
inafter ES 2002]. 
34 United Nations 1997, supra note 2. 
35 ES 2002, supra note 33, at 4. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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“a legally non-binding voluntary pledge to reduce GHG emissions,”38 
those industrial nations that later signed the Kyoto Protocol trans-
formed their voluntary pledges into legally binding obligations.39 
B. The Kyoto Protocol 
1. History and Aims of the Kyoto Protocol 
 In 1997, world leaders assembled in Kyoto, Japan to address cli-
mate change. Led by the United Nations, these world leaders created 
the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol is an interna-
tional agreement specifically designed to reduce the total GHG emis-
sions of both developed countries and countries “undergoing the 
process of transition to a market economy.”40 The Protocol sets targets 
for reducing the levels of six GHGs for the period from 2008 to 2012 
(the first commitment period).41 While specific country targets vary, 
on average these nations pledged to cut their GHG emissions by 5.2 
percent.42 
 Under the rules negotiated in Kyoto, the Protocol did not become 
legally binding until ratified by countries representing fifty-five percent 
of the world’s GHG emissions. Many commentators believed that the 
signature of the United States, a nation responsible for roughly twenty-
five percent of the world’s GHG emissions, was crucial to bring the 
Kyoto Protocol into force.43 The Bush Administration refused to ratify 
the Protocol and its future looked bleak. 
 Russia’s crucial decision to ratify the Protocol in November 2004 
brought the emission representation total up to sixty-one percent, and 
the Protocol came into force on February 16, 2005.44 To date, 141 
countries have pledged to reduce their GHG emissions under the 
                                                                                                                      
38 Instruments for Climate Policy 1 ( Johan Albrect ed., 2002). 
39 U.N. Secretary-General Receives Russia’s Kyoto Protocol Ratification, UNFCC.int, Nov. 18, 
2004, http://unfccc.int./press/interviewsand-statements/items/3290.php. 
40 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
annex 1, Dec. 10, 1997, 32 I.L.M 22, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/ 
kpeng.html [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
41 New Zealand Climate Change Office, The Kyoto Protocol (2006), available at http:// 
climatechange.govt.nz/about/kyoto.html. 
42 Kyoto Protocol Comes into Force, BBC News, Feb. 16, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/science/nature/4267245.stm. 
43 Vinay Ganga & Simon Armitage, The Kyoto Protocol, Carbon Credit Trading and Their 
Impact on Energy Projects in Europe and the World, 2005 Int’l Energy L. & Tax’n Rev. 73, 73–
74. 
44 Kyoto Protocol Comes into Force, supra note 42. 
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Protocol, and of those countries, thirty-six developed countries and 
transitional economies are legally bound to do so.45 While the Proto-
col sets limits on the emissions of those thirty-six nations, it does not 
impose specific mechanisms for meeting them.46 
2. U.S. Federal Resistance to the Kyoto Protocol 
 According to some figures, the United States has “just six percent 
of the world’s total population yet produces a quarter of the globe’s 
carbon dioxide,” making the United States the largest carbon dioxide 
producer in the world.47 U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol garnered 
enormous amounts of criticism. In the Bush Administration’s defense, 
the United States produces huge volumes of carbon dioxide not only 
because it has the highest material wealth (both total and per capita), 
but because it also “suffers from a relatively extreme continental cli-
mate,” a point many Europeans forget.48 U.S. residents use enormous 
amounts of energy to air condition the nation’s desert summers and 
heat the Midwest winters. The U.S. also loves its automobiles. Gasoline 
is relatively cheap (at least from a European perspective) and public 
transportation is severely lacking in most parts of the United States. 
 With the U.S. dependency on fossil fuels at the forefront, Presi-
dent Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol on two grounds: 
I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of 
the world, including major population centers such as China 
and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to 
the U.S. economy. The Senate’s vote, 95-0, shows that there is 
clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and inef-
fective means of addressing global climate change concerns.49 
                                                                                                                      
45 Ganga & Armitage, supra note 43, at 74 (“Only four of the original 34 industrialised 
nations to sign up to the Protocol have refused to take part: the United States, Australia, 
Liechtenstein and Monaco.”). 
46 Id. 
47 CNN (Mar. 9), supra note 31. 
48 National Energy Foundation, Why Do Some Countries Have Higher Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Than Others? (2006), http://www.nef.org.uk/energyadvice/co2emissions 
ctry.htm [hereinafter NEF]. 
49 Letter from George W. Bush, U.S. President, to Senators Hegel, Helms, Craig, and 
Roberts, U.S. Senators (Mar. 13, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2001/03/20010314.html [hereinafter Letter to Senators]. Australia also refused 
to ratify Kyoto. While Australia only accounts for 1.4 percent of global GHG emissions, it 
has the third highest greenhouse pollution per capita in the world. Australia has cited 
similar reasons as the United States for its decision not to ratify. Australia has, however, set 
its own target of an eight percent increase in GHG emissions by 2012, which the Australian 
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President Bush (and ninety-five U.S. Senators) rejected the Kyoto Pro-
tocol in part because the agreement initially excluded the U.S.’s global 
competitors, namely China and India.50 The irony is almost deafening. 
The United States produces on a per capita and aggregate basis vastly 
more carbon dioxide than the developing nations of the world, includ-
ing China and India.51 For instance, in 2001 the United States gener-
ated 20 tons of carbon dioxide per capita, while China generated 2.4 
tons per capita, and India 0.9 tons per capita.52 Yet U.S. Government 
officials walked away from the Kyoto Protocol pointing their fingers at 
China and India. Professor Stephen H. Schneider of Stanford Univer-
sity further explains the fallacy of the President’s position: 
We have to begin allowing the developing world to leapfrog 
past the Victorian Industrial Revolution to new technologies. 
And that’s going to involve having them in the game. But 
they’re not even going to listen unless we have ten years to 
show them that we’re serious, by taking the first step. And 
how can somebody who created 80 percent of the problem 
not be responsible for taking the first step?53 
 President Bush also based his rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on 
the belief that mandatory emissions cuts were a serious threat to the 
                                                                                                                      
Government claims is in line with the Kyoto targets of other industrialized nations in terms 
of economic adjustment required. See Ganga & Armitage, supra note 43, at 74. 
50 In late June 1997, President Clinton addressed a special session of the United Na-
tions in New York and urged the world community to consider economic strategies for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The RFF Reader in Environmental and Resource 
Policy 205 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter RFF]. The following month 
the U.S. Senate passed a resolution 95-0 warning the president not to agree to any treaty at 
the upcoming Kyoto conference that would hurt the U.S. economy or fail to commit the 
large developing nations to similar action. Id. at 206. President Clinton signed the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1998, but it was a “gesture of support with little legal significance.” Id. at 207; 
see also U.S. Signs Global Warming Treaty, CNN.com, Nov. 12, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/ 
TECH/science/9811/12/climate.signing/index.html. The President never submitted the 
treaty to the Senate for ratification. RFF, supra note 50, at 207. However, in the last few 
years some members of Congress have proposed alternative measures for dealing with 
climate change. For example, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) has joined with Senator Joe 
Lieberman (D-CT) in sponsoring the Climate Stewardship Act. “The bill would require 
mandatory reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity generation, trans-
portation, industrial, and commercial sectors of the economy, which represent 85% of 
overall US greenhouse gas emissions.” Brad Knickerbocker, Kyoto Era Begins, USA Today, 
Feb. 15, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-02-15-kyoto-csm_x.htm. 
51 See Who Turned Up The Heat?, in RFF, supra note 50, at 202. 
52 Id. at 202. 
53 Frontline, What’s Up with the Weather? Interview: Stephen H. Schneider, April 2000, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/warming/debate/schneider.html. 
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U.S. economy.54 Mandatory emissions cuts could negatively affect some 
U.S. industries at the outset of compliance with the Protocol. Fred 
Palmer, President of Western Fuels Association, Inc., called the issue of 
global warming “a game-ending kind of issue for the American coal-
fired electricity industry.”55 This type of rhetoric from industry crippled 
the chances of the Protocol succeeding on Capital Hill. 
 Nevertheless, the United States must make changes in how it does 
business as usual and it must make well-informed policy choices in deal-
ing with GHGs. Many believe that the Kyoto Protocol would have been 
a step in the right direction. Initially, experts urged the United States to 
commit to reducing GHG emissions by thirty-three percent. President 
Clinton agreed to a seven percent reduction, a commitment higher 
than the European average commitment. The Bush Administration 
actually received everything it asked for during the Kyoto negotiations, 
namely the ability to use carbon sinks and cap and trade programs to 
reduce GHGs.56 Indeed, Kyoto provided the United States with a broad 
range of policy tools to curb GHG emissions.57 
 The United States has, for the time being, abandoned the interna-
tional community in the growing fight against climate change. As one 
scholar put it, “[w]hereas the U.S. provided political leadership at cru-
cial junctures in the creation and evolution of the ozone regime, it has 
emerged as one of the most important opponents of drastic interna-
tional action to combat GHGs.”58 Yet even without the Kyoto Protocol, 
the United States must reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, especially 
coal. 
 For instance, the United States could utilize non-polluting energy 
sources as its northern neighbor has done. Canada generates much of 
                                                                                                                      
54 President Bush stated, “The Kyoto treaty would have wrecked our economy, if I can 
be blunt.” Bush Rejects Kyoto-style G8 Agreement, BBC News, July 4, 2005, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/americas/4647383.stm. 
55 Frontline, What’s Up with the Weather? Interview: Fred Palmer, April 2006, http:// 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/warming/debate/palmer.html. Mr. Palmer argued that the coal indus-
try would be first in the firing line, ahead of oil and gas, in mandatory carbon emission 
cuts, stating that “[t]he carbon content of the fuel, of the fossil fuel, determines the 
amount of carbon dioxide that is created in a combustion process. And coal is the most 
carbon-rich in terms of the content of the fuel, and it’s 60 to 65 percent carbon. So com-
pared with natural gas, that’s down in the 30 to 35 percent range, I believe.” Id. 
56 Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 14 
Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 363, 365 (2004). 
57 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 40, art. 2. The U.S. introduced trading emissions to ne-
gotiations at Kyoto based on the U.S.’s success with the Clean Air Act. RFF, supra note 50, 
at 207. 
58 The Environment, International Relations and US Foreign Policy 166 (Paul 
G. Harris ed., 2001). 
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its electricity through hydroelectricity, which experts say is one reason 
Canada (also plagued by severe winters) emits much lower carbon 
dioxide amounts than the United States.59 In fact, hydroelectricity 
powers much of the U.S. Pacific Coast.60 The United States could also 
use other non-polluting sources of energy, including biomass, wind, 
and solar energy. The problem is making these technologies as effi-
cient as burning fossil fuels. 
 Some scholars believe that the United States is already on its way 
to cleaning up industry. David Gardiner, former Executive Director of 
the White House Climate Change Task Force (under President Clin-
ton), argued in 2000: “[I]n the USA we’ve broken a cycle dating back 
to the Industrial Revolution, a cycle in which economic growth inevi-
tably leads to more pollution.”61 According to some figures, during 
the 1990s, the U.S. economy “grew almost three-times faster than en-
ergy-related carbon dioxide emissions.”62 Slowing the rise in carbon 
dioxide emissions may be a start, but it is not enough. 
C. Use of Green Taxation in Response to the Conventions 
 In 1997, heeding the warning of climate change, the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) began investi-
gating a uniform carbon dioxide or energy tax for all OECD coun-
tries.63 The OECD produced a number of working papers under the 
project entitled “Policies and Measures for Possible Common Action,”64 
but the project generally produced more questions than answers and 
failed to produce a serious proposal for a uniform OECD carbon or 
energy tax.65 
 In contrast, the European Parliament has officially proposed a 
“50/50” tax on both carbon dioxide emissions and general energy in 
                                                                                                                      
59 NEF, supra note 48. 
60 What’s Up with the Weather? Interview: Stephen H. Schneider, supra note 54 (noting that 
on the East Coast of the United States, electricity is mainly derived through oil, gas, and 
nuclear power; coal accounts for about fifty-six percent of overall electricity in the United 
States). 
61 Instruments for Climate Policy, supra note 38, at 22. 
62 Id. 
63 Ruud A. de Mooij, Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend 1 (2000). 
64 OECD, Climate Change, Energy and Transport, http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
36/0,2340,en_2649_34359_2346468_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) [herein-
after OECD 1997]. 
65 See generally, e.g., Richard Baron, Economic/Fiscal Instruments: Taxation (i.e., Car-
bon/Energy) (OECD Working Paper No. 4, 1997), available at http://www.oecd.org/data- 
oecd/36/50/2392474.pdf; Richard Baron, Economic/Fiscal Instruments: Competitiveness Issues 
Related to Carbon/Energy Taxation (OECD Working Paper No. 14, 1997). 
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response to climate change concerns. However, European Union (EU) 
countries have failed to agree even on the need for such an EU-
imposed tax, much less a full strategy for implementation.66 Neverthe-
less, several EU countries have implemented national carbon taxes, in-
cluding Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. 
III. Tax Policy and the Environment 
A. Options for Environmental Regulation of GHG Emissions 
1. Traditional Command-and-Control Regulation 
 Under traditional command-and-control (CAC) regulation, pol-
luters are required to comply with specified standards (the command) 
and the regulatory authority conducts stringent monitoring and en-
forcement (the control).67 CAC regulation ensures that firms curb pol-
luting practices. Moreover, CAC regulation is source specific, meaning 
it requires every firm under its scope to reduce emissions. 
 While many countries have had some form of CAC over the past 
few decades (especially with regard to air and water pollution), many 
policymakers believe this approach is inflexible and inhibits innova-
tive development by placing all the decision-making power in the 
hands of bureaucratic regulators.68 CAC regulation is also costly to 
administer because of the need for close monitoring. 
2. Economic Incentives 
 Economic incentives (EIs), on the other hand, have become in-
creasingly popular around the globe. The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has adopted a broad definition of EIs as “any instrument 
that provides continuous inducements, financial or otherwise, to en-
courage responsible parties to reduce their release of pollutants or 
make their products less polluting.”69 As such, EIs include tradable 
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permit schemes and green taxes. EIs have a number of advantages over 
traditional CAC regulation in controlling GHG emissions.70 First, EIs 
encourage polluters to “reduce pollution below permitted amounts 
when it is relatively inexpensive to do so.”71 Second, EIs promote tech-
nological innovation. Polluters will be willing to spend resources on 
alternative energy sources, for example, when economically efficient.72 
Third, EIs are better suited to cover a wide range of polluters, large and 
small, because EIs do not demand the amount of enforcement re-
quired by CAC regulation.73 
 One form of EIs is emissions trading schemes. Under an emis-
sions trading scheme, the environmental authority allocates to par-
ticipants a certain number of permits to release emissions (or “right 
to pollute” coupons), which can be sold or traded among the partici-
pants. Polluters who can curb their emissions at a low cost can sell 
their excess permits to other participants for whom it would be very 
costly to reduce emissions. Emissions trading schemes are not source 
specific; rather the target set by the environmental authority is a total 
of emissions. Conceptually, the same net reduction of emissions that 
would be achieved through CAC regulation can be achieved through 
trading schemes, but at a much lower cost.74 
 Some policymakers favor so-called grandfathered permit markets 
that give polluters their initial distributions of permits according to his-
torical emissions.75 In other words, under a grandfathered regime, well-
established businesses are favored over new industry entrants. Follow-
ing the popularity of grandfathered permit markets in the United 
States, several similar schemes have developed across the globe.76 
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3. Environmental Taxation 
 Green taxes can also be useful tools in regulating GHG emis-
sions. There is no generally accepted definition of an environmental 
tax. According to the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(Eurostat), an environmental or green tax is: “A tax whose tax base is 
a physical unit (or a proxy of it) of something that has a proven, spe-
cific negative impact on the environment.”77 According to this defini-
tion, the tax base determines whether the tax is an environmental tax. 
Understandably, Eurostat has chosen a pragmatic definition. The mo-
tivation behind implementing a tax can be difficult to quantify, and 
thus Eurostat, being in the business of statistical analysis, looks simply 
at what is being taxed. 
 In contrast, the OECD has used the following definition: 
Full coverage of the use of fiscal instruments in environ-
mental policy will . . . need to consider both: 
 (i) Taxes which have been introduced to achieve a specific 
environmental objective, and which have been explicitly iden-
tified as “environmental taxes.” 
 (ii) Taxes which are introduced initially for non-environ-
mental reasons, but which impact on environmental objec-
tives, and which may be increased, modified or reduced for 
environmental reasons.78 
 This Article focuses on taxes in category (i), taxes motivated by 
environmental concern. Though outside the scope of this Article, poli-
cymakers, when making difficult policy choices regarding climate 
change, should also consider category (ii) taxes, those taxes that have 
accidentally had positive environmental affects. 
 Like permit trading schemes, taxes are economic incentives de-
signed to change behavior. Green taxes encourage a broad range of 
entities to take environmentally friendly measures through price in-
centives. In contrast to permit schemes, policymakers can use taxes to 
raise public revenue. For instance, the U.K. Office of National Statis-
tics reports that environmental taxes raised thirty-two billion pounds 
in 2001 (approximately forty-six billion dollars).79 Large figures such 
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as this almost certainly do not include the administrative costs of im-
plementing green taxes and will often include taxes not motivated by 
environmental concerns (e.g. transport taxes). 
 Carbon taxes are excise taxes based on the carbon content of fuel, 
requiring the payment of a fixed fee for every ton of carbon emitted.80 
The basic economic premise behind carbon taxation is straightforward: 
market prices for carbon-based fuels such as oil, coal, and gas do not 
reflect the full environmental costs of their production and consump-
tion and, therefore, the price of these fuels should be raised to account 
for these negative externalities. Raising the price of carbon-content fuel 
relative to cleaner burning fuel will encourage some consumers to de-
crease their use of carbon-content fuel. Policymakers thus guide con-
sumers where Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” failed. Implementing such 
a tax, however, is not as straightforward. 
B. Supporters of These Emissions Regulation Options 
1. Private Industry 
 In his book, Public Choice and Environmental Regulation, Gert Ting-
gaard Svendsen of the Aarhus School of Business in Denmark discusses 
the general attitude of private industry, state government, heavily regu-
lated industry, and environmental groups toward the options for emis-
sions regulation.81 Svendsen reports that private industry generally 
supports permit markets.82 Permit trading schemes are more flexible 
than CAC regulation, which does “not readily adapt to changing eco-
nomic conditions, and therefore, does not embrace new technological 
solutions.”83 Green taxes are rigid and may be arbitrarily set, while 
permit markets allow the market to set prices. Moreover, private indus-
try particularly supports grandfathering schemes that effectively make 
it more difficult for future competitors to enter the industry.84 
                                                                                                                      
80 RFF, supra note 50, at 226. 
81 See generally Svendsen, supra note 76. 
82 Id. at 26. 
83 Tradeable Emissions: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, 105th Cong. (1997) 
(statement of Carleton W. Bartels, Managing Director, Canter Fitzgerald Environmental 
Brokerage Services), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/hearings/emission/bartels. 
htm. 
84 Svendsen, supra note 75, at 36. 
426 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:411 
2. State Government 
 Svendsen argues that state governments prefer green taxes be-
cause of the ability to maximize tax revenues.85 Nordic green taxes in 
the 1990s taught policymakers that it can be difficult to net substantial 
revenues through green taxation. Governments should consider the 
ability for even relatively small amounts of revenue to self-sustain fur-
ther environmental projects. In other words, revenue from green 
taxes can be recycled back into projects that further environmental 
protection. 
 The political success of trading permit schemes should not be over-
looked. The environmental success of trading schemes in the United 
States has encouraged several other governments to choose permit trad-
ing over green taxation. For many governments, green taxation is an 
uphill battle against the powerful forces of industry, a battle potentially 
not worth fighting.86 
3. Heavily Regulated Industry 
 Svendsen contends that heavily regulated industry, for example 
public utilities, will generally follow the state’s interest and chose green 
taxation or CAC regulation; in return, regulated industry can maintain 
their monopoly.87 It seems plausible that regulated industry would fol-
low the interests of government, because such entities are essentially an 
extension of government. However, for the reasons outlined above, 
governments may instead choose permit schemes. Heavily regulated 
industry will lobby for exemption from whatever form of regulation is 
implemented, and are often successful.88 
4. Environmental Groups 
 Svendsen reasons that environmental groups will chose to cooper-
ate with industry out of self-interest. He argues that members of envi-
ronmental groups must pay membership fees, paying members want 
results, and the best way for the organization to provide results is by 
cooperating with industry and lobbying for permit trading schemes. 
This proposition seems overly cynical, and based on more recent re-
search, unsubstantiated. Sierra Club, the environmental group Svend-
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sen uses as an example, supports a wide range of policy tools.89 For ex-
ample, the Sierra Club supports U.S. federal regulation requiring 
automakers to use modern fuel-saving technology, a type of CAC regu-
lation.90 
 Moreover, the Sierra Club opposes emissions trading schemes be-
cause of resulting “hotspots.”91 In essence, because most emissions trad-
ing schemes do not put a CAC-type limit on the amount of pollution 
allowed from a particular source (i.e. polluters can purchase an unlim-
ited number of permits), areas around these remaining high polluters 
become hotspots. The Sierra Club opposes the EPA’s proposed mer-
cury trading scheme under the Clean Air Act because “dirty plants 
could continue to emit high levels of mercury beyond 2018 and create 
mercury ‘hotspots’ by simply purchasing mercury pollution credits 
from cleaner plants.”92 
 Traditional CAC regulation is source specific, requiring each pol-
luter to reduce GHG emissions. Green taxation and emissions trading 
schemes, on the other hand, provide economic incentives for pollut-
ers to reduce emissions but do not demand that each polluter reduce 
emissions. Instead, these EIs focus on total reduction of emissions and 
as such allow industry greater flexibility in compliance. 
IV. Environmental (Green) Taxation 
A. What Can Green Taxation Achieve? 
 Green taxes may be used to punish polluters. The general princi-
ple of increasing taxes on “bads” (e.g. polluting, smoking) and decreas-
ing taxes on “goods” (e.g. labor)93 was first adopted by the OECD in 
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1972.94 Environmental agencies across the globe use this underlying 
principle as a reason for implementing green taxes.95 Countries includ-
ing Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands have at-
tempted to shift the tax burden of labor and capital to the use of envi-
ronmental resources through the implementation of green taxes.96 
Green taxes are also often designed to change behavior. Taxes must be 
set high enough to “make it attractive for customers to use more envi-
ronmentally benign products and practices.”97 For example, in 1989 
the U.S. Congress introduced a federal tax on Ozone Depleting 
Chemicals. Initially the tax on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) was $1.37 
per pound, approximately twice the then-current product price.98 By 
1995, the federal tax was $3.10 per pound.99 The Federal Government 
simultaneously introduced the Clean Air Act, which put a cap on most 
CFCs with a phase-out in 2000. Nevertheless, many analysts believe that 
the tax, not the cap, is responsible for U.S. ozone gas reduction.100 
 Similarly, policymakers can use green taxes to channel good be-
havior and influence the choice of resources used. For example, gov-
ernments may want to discourage the use of exhaustible natural re-
sources and provide more attractive alternatives through the use of 
the tax system.101 Governments may also use green taxes to generate 
revenue. Governments may choose to use the resulting revenue to pay 
for damages created from past pollution or for measures to reduce 
future pollution. For example, of the thirty-two billion pounds gener-
ated by U.K. environmental taxes in 2001, fourteen percent purport-
edly was allocated to environmental projects.102 
 Tax shifting describes the economic theory that by combining a 
significant pollution tax with a major restructuring of the national tax 
system, government can make the overall economy more efficient. 
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This theory often arises in conjunction with raising revenue. In the 
early 1990s, many scholars suggested that governments could eradi-
cate unemployment by implementing high environmental taxes. The 
debate was most vigorous in European countries with strong envi-
ronmental political parties and high unemployment.103 
B. At What Stage Should Green Taxation Be Applied? 
1. Direct Tax on Emissions 
 Environmental taxes may be applied directly or indirectly to 
GHGs.104 Taxing greenhouse emissions is a form of direct tax. When a 
country seeks to reduce or curb GHG emissions, it seems reasonable to 
directly tax emissions, and thus provide an immediate price incentive to 
stop polluting. However, calculating the amount a polluter emits can be 
difficult and/or costly.105 Thus, direct emissions taxes may be useful 
when there are few large polluters and, as such, calculation of emis-
sions is feasible.106 Policymakers may also choose an emissions tax when 
there is no correspondence between input or final products and emis-
sions, the alternative form of tax.107 For instance, there is generally “full 
correspondence between characteristics of raw materials and emissions 
of CO2,” but “little correspondence in relation to emissions of NO2.”108 
2. Indirect Tax on Inputs or Final Products 
 Alternatively, in order to curb GHG emissions, policymakers may 
choose to apply an indirect tax on inputs or final products. Histori-
cally, OECD countries have chosen this form of indirect tax, rather 
than tax emissions directly.109 Ole Fauchald suggests that one reason 
countries have chosen the indirect tax route is their aim to establish 
neutral tax systems in relation to the behavior of consumers and pro-
ducers.110 Fauchald argues that such an approach “does not seem ap-
propriate” because the objective of environmental taxes is “precisely 
to affect the choices of producers and consumers for the benefit of 
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the environment.”111 While there is evidence that countries seek neu-
trality (or at least the appearance of neutrality), the primary choice of 
the indirect tax over the direct emissions tax is probably the relative 
ease to which it can be implemented. 
C. Limits to Green Taxation 
1. Death of the Double Dividend Hypothesis? 
 In the early 1990s, Dutch and Northern European scholars pro-
duced a large volume of literature proclaiming the merits of environ-
mental taxes.112 This literature included a number of economic models 
suggesting that environmental taxes could be used to raise significant 
public revenue.113 One such model, the “double dividend hypothesis,” 
envisaged a two-fold return from environmental taxation.114 The first 
return, or dividend, was the increase in environmental quality.115 The 
second dividend was the reduction of other taxes, namely the ability to 
shift the burden of taxation away from labor and toward the environ-
ment in order to boost employment or public welfare.116 
 Currently, most policymakers believe that the second dividend is 
unrealistic.117 The green tax, like any other tax, exacerbates the inef-
ficiencies of the existing tax system.118 Much of the early double divi-
dend literature previously ignored this negative “tax interaction ef-
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fect,”119 focusing only on the good aspects of carbon taxes—the re-
duction of carbon emissions and the ability to raise revenue that 
could be used to reduce existing taxes and their inefficiencies (“reve-
nue recycling effect”).120 However, most economists now agree that 
“the tax interaction effect does exist and may actually be as large as— 
or even larger than—the revenue recycling effect, so the double divi-
dend argument has pretty much been ruled out.”121 For this reason, 
the first dividend—the promise of a cleaner environment—must be 
the driving force behind green taxes. While this may be a harder sale, 
the onset of the Kyoto Protocol has made countries more amenable to 
the possibilities of carbon and energy taxes. Although taxes may not 
be set high enough to eradicate unemployment, revenues from green 
taxes can be recycled back to at least partially offset “bad” taxes.122 
Moreover, some of the revenues raised by green taxes may be recycled 
into environmental projects and research. Such a program, in es-
sence, creates a green double dividend and makes good policy sense. 
 In an extreme example, some Belgian green taxes are so low it 
costs the government more to collect them.123 This fact alone does 
not necessarily make the tax inefficient. The persistence of such taxes 
signals that the Belgian Government has determined that the social 
benefits outweigh the administrative costs. 
 A minority of scholars still believe the double dividend is possible 
through tax shifting—a complete restructuring of the national tax sys-
tem.124 One study by Dutch economist Ruud de Mooij claims that the 
double dividend could be achieved by improving terms of trade.125 For 
example, de Mooij’s model suggests that an OECD-wide energy tax 
would force energy demand within the OECD to fall.126 If such demand 
fell by a significant amount (de Mooij’s model suggests a fall of 1.8 per-
cent), the price of energy on the world market would fall and improve 
the terms of trade for OECD countries.127 Finally, improvement in 
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terms of trade could yield a “strong” double dividend for the countries 
of OECD.128 
2. Political Barriers to Direct Emissions Policies 
 Big industry is sometimes a big problem for policymakers de-
voted to environmental taxes. Energy industry groups argue that envi-
ronmental taxes hinder global competitiveness.129 The effectiveness of 
this claim is perhaps most evident in the public statements by leaders 
of the United States and Australia in rejecting the Kyoto Protocol.130 A 
survey of recent literature reveals that scholars are working to counter 
this fear and have suggested at least five techniques to reduce the ef-
fects from environmental taxes on competitiveness.131 
 First, a country may introduce a relatively low rate of environ-
mental tax.132 A tax that is too low, however, will not only fail to affect 
competitiveness, but will also fail to have substantial beneficial envi-
ronmental effects. In the words of the OECD, a tax that is too low will 
simply be a “revenue raising device” not an environmental tax.133 In-
deed, the EPA proposes that green taxes tend to be set too low to have 
a significant impact on the environment, with few exceptions.134 
 Second, scholars suggest that countries may “exempt those indus-
tries or products that are exposed to international competition from 
the tax.”135 Many countries have used this technique, but this method 
“raises serious problems related to cost-effectiveness and the achieve-
ment of the environmental objective in question.”136 Third, countries 
may subsidize parts of industry subject to competitive disadvantages.137 
Fourth, countries can make domestic taxes dependent on whether for-
eign producers competing in the same market as domestic producers 
are subject to similar taxes.138 Finally, countries can offset the adverse 
effects of environmental taxes through a mechanism called a “border 
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tax adjustment.”139 For example, by applying the tax to final products 
rather than to raw materials, a country has greater freedom to adjust 
the tax as the product either enters or leaves the country.140 
D. Carbon Taxes and Credits 
1. Defining Carbon Taxation 
 Currently, carbon is regarded as the most threatening GHG. As 
such, several countries have implemented carbon taxes in an effort to 
curb the potential destruction from increasing carbon in our atmos-
phere.141 
 Carbon taxes are generally revenue neutral: revenue generated is 
recycled back into the economy to enhance welfare, usually in an at-
tempt to offset tax burdens in other areas or to invest in environmen-
tally sound technology.142 True carbon taxes are based on the carbon 
content of fuel, however, some literature incorrectly sweeps general 
taxes on energy under the umbrella of “carbon taxes,” because such 
taxes are often aimed at lowering concentrations of carbon dioxide 
(and possibly other GHGs) in the atmosphere.143 Most scholars agree 
that general energy taxes are inferior to true carbon taxes in reducing 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.144 
2. Case Studies 
a. European Union 
 The EU-15 committed collectively to reduce their 1990 green-
house gas emission by eight percent by 2012.145 However, in EU Coun-
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cil Decision 358/CE, the EU-15 separately agreed to redistribute the 
burden among themselves.146 For example, under the Decision, France 
is committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by zero percent.147 
Germany is committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by twenty-
one percent.148 Members outside the EU-15 made commitments rang-
ing from six to eight percent.149 For example, Hungary and Poland 
committed to a six percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 
1990 levels.150 
 EU bodies have debated the utility of a common carbon tax ap-
plied across the European Commission (EC) Community.151 Follow-
ing the Rio Conference on Climate Change in 1991, the EC Commu-
nity began evaluating mechanisms for reducing GHGs, particularly 
carbon emissions, including the concept of an EU common carbon 
tax. Eventually, the EC gave its approval for a fifty percent carbon con-
tent and fifty percent energy cost tax (“50/50 tax”) to be applied to all 
Member States.152 As the name suggests, fifty percent of the tax would 
be based on carbon emissions, while the other fifty percent would be 
imposed on energy production (including nuclear power, but exclud-
ing renewable energy sources).153 
 Under this proposal, Member States would be free to allocate the 
revenue raised through the tax as they wished.154 The proposal was 
met with early resistance. Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland ob-
jected to the 50/50 tax because they were at earlier stages of industri-
alization than other EU Members. They argued that a common EU 
tax would cripple any hopes of catching up to more industrialized na-
tions like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.155 In addition, 
they argued that their respective energy use was relatively lower than 
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other EU members and thus did not demand immediate response 
through a rigid tax scheme.156 All fifteen members of the EU, apart 
from the United Kingdom, eventually formed a consensus and 
“agreed upon the necessity of the tax on an EU level.”157 The United 
Kingdom was not entirely alone—the EC also could not agree to EU-
wide implementation.158 Nevertheless, some European countries, such 
as Finland, subsequently modified their energy taxation schemes to fit 
the model discussed by the EC.159 
 The idea of a common carbon tax in the European Union is not 
entirely dead. In 2005, the EC published an external study finding 
that “a common EU carbon tax would be the most cost-efficient way 
of reaching the EU climate policy objectives.”160 However, the study 
acknowledged that a carbon tax “would have a somewhat negative 
impact on competitiveness in some energy-intensive sectors” and that 
“[t]hese effects would be alleviated only slightly by exempting energy-
intensive sectors from energy taxation.”161 
 The EU governing bodies have also encouraged tax as a useful 
tool in achieving Member States’ Kyoto targets. For instance, while 
Directive 2003/87 establishes a scheme for emissions trading, the Di-
rective states that “the instrument of taxation can be a national policy 
to limit emissions from installations temporarily excluded.”162 In 
other words, the Directive encourages the use of tax on activities not 
presently covered by the EU Emissions Scheme. 
 A majority of EU-15 members have enacted some form of carbon 
or energy tax (or both) as part of their plan to reduce GHG emissions. 
EU countries with carbon taxes include Finland, Sweden, the Nether-
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lands, Denmark, Italy, and France.163 Other European countries have so 
far rejected true carbon taxes and opted for general energy taxes in-
stead. These countries include Germany, the United Kingdom, Austria, 
and Belgium. 
 It may be helpful to view the introduction of carbon taxes across 
Europe in two distinct waves. The first wave of carbon taxes began in 
Northern Europe and the Netherlands in the early 1990s. With the 
exception of the Netherlands, these carbon taxes were introduced 
into already existing general energy tax regimes.164 Finland intro-
duced the world’s first carbon tax in 1990.165 In 1991, Sweden fol-
lowed, introducing a carbon tax and cutting existing energy taxes by 
fifty percent as part of a comprehensive reformation of the tax sys-
tem.166 The overall effect was a significant increase in energy taxa-
tion.167 In 1992, the Netherlands introduced a fuel environmental tax 
with taxation basis of fifty percent for energy and fifty percent for car-
bon.168 Denmark introduced its own carbon tax in 1993.169 
 Other EU members have only reluctantly decided on taxation as 
a tool for emissions reduction after facing poor Kyoto target outlooks. 
This second wave of countries are divided over whether to introduce 
general energy taxes or more specific carbon taxes. For instance, Italy 
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and France introduced carbon taxes in 1999 and 2000, respectively.170 
However, Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Belgium have 
opted for general energy taxes.171 Slovenia was the first accession state 
to implement a carbon tax in 1997.172 Poland also has a small tax on 
carbon emissions that amounts to a carbon tax.173 
b. Denmark 
 Under the Kyoto Accord, Denmark, a wealthy, green-friendly, na-
tion, pledged to cut its 1990 GHG emissions twenty-one percent by 
2012.174 Denmark’s carbon tax went into effect in 1992 for households 
and in 1993 for industry.175 The tax was “levied on all fossil fuels in 
proportion to their carbon content” and accompanied a general en-
ergy tax and sulfur dioxide (SO2) tax.176 Scholars have criticized the 
                                                                                                                      
170 See generally Energy Information Administration, Italy: Environmental Issues 
(2003), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/itenv.pdf (providing information on Italy’s 
carbon tax); Energy Information Administration, France: Environmental Issues 
(2003), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/franenv.pdf (providing information on France’s 
carbon tax). 
171 See generally Diefenbacher et. al., FEASTA Review No. 2, How Have Ecotaxes 
Worked in Germany?, available at http://www.feasta.org/documents/review2/ecotaxes. 
htm (for information on Germany’s energy tax); see also German Embassy Washington, 
D.C., Germany’s Ecological Tax Reform, available at http://www.germany.info/relaunch/ 
business/taxes/eco_tax.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007); Austrian Energy Agency, Re-
newable Energy in Austria, available at http://www.energyagency.at/projekte/ren-in-
a01.htm (for information on Austria’s energy tax) (last visited Apr. 24, 2007); ODYSSEE 
Project, Energy Efficiency and CO2 Emissions in Austria (2004), available at 
http://www.odyssee-indicators.org/Publication/Energy%20efficiency%20policies%20mea- 
sures.html; ODYSSEE Project, Energy Efficiency in the UK (2004), available at http:// 
www.odyssee-indicators.org/Publication/PDF/uk_r04.pdf (for information on U.K. energy 
taxes); UK Fuel Tax: the Facts, BBC NEWS, Sept. 21, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/1/hi/in_depth/world/2000/world_fuel_crisis/933648.stm (for information on U.K. 
fuel tax); Paul O’Brien et al., OECD, Encouraging environmentally sustainable 
growth in Belgium (2001), available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2001doc.nsf/linkto/ 
eco-wkp(2001)26 (select English language adobe file) (for information on energy taxes in 
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ited May 4, 2007). 
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bers). 
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Danish carbon tax on three grounds.177 First, the tax has been criticized 
for being far too low.178 Second, the tax has been criticized because the 
refund system for energy-intensive firms provided little economic in-
centive to reduce emissions.179 Under the carbon tax scheme, VAT-
registered firms were required to pay only half per ton of carbon emit-
ted as were Danish households burning fossil fuels.180 Finally, some 
commentators argued that the accompanying energy tax wrongly “fa-
voured fossil fuel-based energy production by electric utilities because it 
[was] levied on electricity consumption and not on fuel inputs.”181 
 In 1996, Denmark modified its green tax system with the intro-
duction of the aptly titled Green Tax Package.182 Again, the Green 
Tax Package included a carbon tax and a tax on energy and sulfur 
dioxide. This time around, however, the Government implemented a 
system whereby tax rates increased gradually, “thus giving companies 
time to improve energy efficiency.”183 However, little else about the 
carbon tax changed. Nevertheless, in 1999, the Danish Energy Au-
thority gave the tax scheme a glowing review, claiming: 
[T]he Green Tax Package has contributed significantly to 
the attainment of the expected targets for CO2 emissions . . . 
the additional taxes on trade and industry had no noticeable 
consequences for the economy or competitiveness of the 
companies as a whole. This is mainly due to the redirection 
of revenue to trade and industry and tax rebates for energy-
intensive enterprises.184 
 The merit of these glowing claims is suspect in view of Denmark’s 
Kyoto target projections. Rather than working toward reducing levels 
by twenty-one percent, Denmark has so far increased emissions by 6.3 
percent since 1990.185 One commentator quipped, “the likely gap be-
tween [Denmark’s] Kyoto commitment and its emissions levels pro-
jected for 2010 is 25.2 percentage points . . . despite all those wind-
mills.”186 The likely reason that Denmark’s current green tax system 
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does not find much support in economic theory is that it contains 
high environmental taxes on consumers and, by European standards, 
low environmental taxes on industry. 
c. Norway 
 Norway is not a member of the European Union, but it is a signa-
tory to the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Protocol, Norway is actually 
allowed to increase emissions one percent over 1990 levels for the first 
commitment period (2008-2012).187 As a wealthy nation, some schol-
ars argue that it can easily “afford” environmental protection, a con-
tention supported by the fact that Norway has had some form of envi-
ronmental taxes since the 1970s.188 
 Norway introduced a carbon tax in 1991. At that time, however, a 
general tax on energy was already in place.189 There was not a large-
scale tax system reformation because of the carbon tax, but there was 
a simultaneous decrease of the income tax.190 A 2004 report by the 
OECD noted that Norway has “one of the highest OECD levels of car-
bon taxes,” signaling “a willingness by Norwegian society to sacrifice 
near-term interests for the greater good.”191 However, the report also 
stated that the effectiveness of Norway’s carbon tax “has often been 
undermined by inconsistencies, either within policy design itself or 
with other policy goals.”192 
 Norway’s carbon tax has been criticized on several fronts. Most 
significantly, for failing to evenly apportion the tax burden, instead 
favoring certain industries.193 According to the OECD, “[t]he carbon 
tax scheme has been inefficient because of high variability of tax rates 
across emission sources and exemptions.”194 
 In 1999, Norway restructured its energy tax system.195 Part of the 
reform transformed previous carbon-components in various energy 
taxes into one unified carbon tax, the motivation of which was to spe-
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cifically reduce carbon dioxide emissions.196 Norway’s current carbon 
tax is a tax on the use of mineral oils (including fuel oils, auto diesel, 
and jet fuel), petrol, coal, and coke.197 Norway also implemented an 
additional carbon tax on petroleum activities on the continental 
shelf.198 However, the Norwegian tax scheme continues to exempt a 
large sector of industry.199 The Norwegian carbon tax on coal and coke 
exempts industries using those products as raw materials, meaning that 
ninety percent of carbon dioxide emissions are not subject to the car-
bon tax.200 A report sponsored by Eurostat concluded that Norway, like 
Denmark and the other Nordic countries, needed to readjust its carbon 
tax system in order to make polluters pay in proportion to their emis-
sions.201 
d. The United Kingdom 
 The United Kingdom is the world’s seventh largest producer of 
carbon emissions.202 The United Kingdom agreed, under the Kyoto 
Protocol, to keep annual greenhouse emissions to 12.5 percent below 
its 1990 levels during the initial period (2008-2012).203 It set a goal to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by twenty percent by the year 2010.204 
 The Climate Change Levy (CCL) came into force on April 1, 
2001.205 The CCL taxes non-domestic use of electricity, natural gas as 
supplied by a gas utility, liquefied petroleum gas, and coal.206 The 
CCL proposes to “encourage the efficient use of energy, in order to 
meet the U.K.’s target under the Kyoto Protocol.”207 While some lit-
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erature misleadingly refers to the levy as a carbon tax, the levy is actu-
ally a tax on energy, applied at a specific rate per unit of energy con-
sumed.208 The CCL notably excludes oil, road fuel gas, and heat.209 
 The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution was particu-
larly critical of the CCL for taxing the downstream use of energy.210 In 
other words, the levy is paid by energy users, but “collected from the 
suppliers of energy products . . . .”211 Instead, the Royal Commission 
argued for the implementation of an upstream carbon tax,212 or excise 
tax, on the producers of raw fossil fuels based on the relative carbon 
content of those fuels.213 As the Royal Commission suggested, a true 
carbon tax applied to all energy users raises the cost of carbon-packed 
fuels and appropriately discourages the use of such fuels.214 In contrast, 
the CCL does not discourage the use of carbon-packed fuels because 
the levy is fixed to energy used and not to carbon content.215 Carbon 
taxes are more efficient than general energy taxes because they specifi-
cally target those fuels that contribute to climate change.216 
 Sometimes, politics can be to blame. The Labour party believed a 
domestic secondary tax on fuel could be “easily portrayed” by oppo-
nents as a “stealth tax” to U.K. consumers, a political killer to a party 
whose platform included not raising taxes.217 Even the developers of 
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the CCL agreed that because energy is used in the production of all 
commodities, the CCL tax on energy would eventually “increase the 
prices paid by final consumers for all commodities.”218 
 Moreover, the Royal Commission rejected Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Custom (HMRC) claim that a tax directly relating to the carbon 
content of fuels was impractical, explaining, “[i]n the case of a fuel 
used for electricity generation the generator would pay an amount in 
tax determined by reference to its carbon content and would pass the 
tax on to distributors and end users through the price charged for the 
electrical energy.”219 The Royal Commission’s plan would then exempt 
carbon-free sources such as wind or hydropower.220 Ideally, the Royal 
Commission would like to see such a carbon tax applied Europe-wide; 
however, the current Government has made it very clear it is against 
such a tax. 221 
e. Japan 
 Japan has pledged, under the Kyoto Protocol, to reduce its emis-
sion of GHGs to six percent below its 1990 level in the first commit-
ment period (2008-2012).222 Originally, Japan’s plan to meet its Kyoto 
commitment consisted of the use of carbon sinks and the reduction of 
fluorocarbons.223 Japan determined merely to keep carbon emissions 
of energy sources from increasing (a zero percent reduction) and set 
a 0.5 percent reduction target of carbon-dioxide emissions from non-
energy sources.224 The Japanese Government later reconsidered and 
adopted a new package to achieve its goals under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The industrial sector is now requested to reduce its carbon emissions 
by 8.6 percent from 1990 levels in 2010.225 
 In 2004, the Japanese Ministry of Environment first announced a 
plan for implementation of a carbon tax to help meet Kyoto targets. 
The proposed tax was directed at all types of fossil fuels and electric-
ity, imposed at the stage of shipment from refineries for gasoline, light 
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oil, kerosene, and liquefied petroleum gas, and at the final consump-
tion stage for coal, heavy oil, natural gas, city gas, electricity, and jet 
fuel.226 However, after enormous pressure from industry, the Ministry 
announced a revised tax plan on October 25, 2005. The proposed 
carbon tax exempted coal used in certain types of manufacturing and 
halved tax rates for businesses that produced large amounts of car-
bon.227 The Ministry also delayed the implementation of tax on “gaso-
line, diesel and jet fuel to avoid putting too much economic burden 
on end-users.”228 Under the new plan, a Japanese household would 
pay an average of 2100 yen a year for electricity, gas, kerosene, and 
other fuels, 900 yen more per year than under the old plan.229 
 In the OECD’s 2002 Environmental Performance report on Ja-
pan, the OECD noted that environmental taxes and charges were 
used less frequently in Japan than in a number of other OECD coun-
tries, and urged that this policy be reviewed.230 The Japanese Gov-
ernment finally responded to the OECD’s report last year, reporting 
merely that it was investigating the impact of environmental taxes and 
discussing the consequences with industry.231 Indeed, the weight of 
industry pressures has meant that the Japanese Government has yet to 
commit to a carbon tax.232 Yet the Japanese Government must do 
something, and soon, if it hopes to hit Kyoto targets. Instead of being 
on track to reduce its GHG levels by six percent, GHG emissions in 
2004 were 7.4 percent higher than the 1990 levels.233 
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3. Tax Credits: The U.S. Example 
 Fearing a negative impact on industry, the Bush Administration 
rejected the Kyoto Protocol. Had the United States ratified the Proto-
col, it would have been required to cut GHG emissions by 7.2 percent 
of its 1990 level by 2012.234 Instead, President Bush’s climate change 
policy aims to cut GHG emission intensity by eighteen percent by 
2012.235 The plan also uses tax credits to support the invention and 
use of energy-saving technologies, and promote absorption of carbon 
dioxide through forestry and agriculture.236 Finally, the plan requires 
recordkeeping of GHG emissions and encourages the private sector 
to reduce emissions voluntarily.237 
 The Bush Administration will likely meet its target of reducing 
emissions intensity by eighteen percent over a decade.238 Policies set in 
motion by the Bush Administration will probably have little to do with 
this success; rather a bit of black magic accounting is likely to carry the 
day. Emissions intensity is calculated by dividing emissions by the real 
gross domestic product (GDP). With GDP projected to grow by three 
percent annually, the Bush Administration’s figures suggest that emis-
sions can actually increase by 10.2 percent and still satisfy the intensity 
target.239 To avoid this result, the Kyoto Protocol sets a base year and 
requires its signatories to reduce actual emissions levels relative to that 
base year.240 In contrast, the Bush Administration’s own forecasts “indi-
cate that the plan allows emissions in 2012 to be over 95 percent of 
what they would have been with no policy.”241 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) provides several tax cred-
its to businesses and individuals who choose environmentally friendly 
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products.242 As a tax credit, a consumer or business will be able to re-
duce its federal tax liability dollar for dollar.243 
 EPACT “offers consumers and businesses federal tax credits be-
ginning in January 2006 for purchasing fuel-efficient hybrid-electric 
vehicles and energy-efficient appliances and products,”244 including 
up to a 3400 dollar reduction in income tax liability for individuals 
and business that purchase a hybrid gas-electric car.245 However, ac-
cording to a recent Consumer Reports, “hybrids are typically priced 
thousands of dollars higher than similar all-gas models,”246 and “even 
the most cost-effective models require an investment of about five 
years for the owner to break even.”247 
 Thus, in terms of the hybrid car, the federal tax credit simply re-
aligns the cost of the vehicle with that of a non-hybrid vehicle. Similarly, 
EPACT’s credit system may not make other environmental friendly al-
ternatives (for example, solar-heated pools and energy-efficient win-
dows) cheaper than their unfriendly alternatives. Notably, however, a 
consumer must pay a premium price (potentially thousands of dollars) 
for these alternatives for the promise of reimbursement a year later on 
his or her tax return. Given this extra hurdle, EPACT will probably only 
impact already green-minded consumers. 
  EPACT should be extended beyond its 2007 expiration because 
it is an aid to already green-minded consumers and, over time, the 
increased demand for environmentally friendly alternatives could 
drive down the prices of such alternatives. However, EPACT is not 
enough. The United States must also adopt a direct emissions policy 
to have any real impact. 
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V. Alternatives to Green Taxation 
A. Carbon Sinks 
 Trees and other plants use carbon to grow while releasing oxygen 
into the atmosphere.248 Carbon sinks are simply large areas or reser-
voirs where this process takes place.249 The Earth’s largest carbon sinks 
are its oceans and forests.250 In other words, more trees means less car-
bon dioxide. Under the Kyoto Protocol, a new or expanded forest is 
allowed to generate credits for removing carbon from the atmos-
phere.251 
 Several countries have embraced carbon sinks as part of their 
plans to meet Kyoto targets.252 Japan, as mentioned, expects carbon 
sinks to play an integral part in meeting its Kyoto targets. Under Japan’s 
Action Plan, it is “allowed credits of up to 13 million tons of carbon per 
year from forest sequestration, which can be used against its emis-
sions.”253 As such, the use of carbon sinks in Japan may account for 
more than half of the carbon reductions from the 1990 base year.254 To 
this aim, Japan has enacted the Forest and Forestry Plan and other 
relevant plans.255 According to economists Masahiro Amano and Roger 
A. Sedjo, Japan is in a particularly good position with regard to carbon 
sinks because it has relatively young forests and more carbon will be 
sequestered as they mature.256 However, once trees mature carbon se-
questration levels off. Japan may still need to decrease current rates of 
deforestation.257 This could mean substituting lost timber with imports, 
not a globally satisfying outcome as this simply displaces timber harvest-
ing offshore. 258 
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 Similarly, the New Zealand Government is relying on carbon 
sinks to meet its Kyoto targets and negotiated a “Forest Industry De-
velopment Agenda” with the forest sector in 2005. The New Zealand 
Government expects that forests planted after 1990, Kyoto’s base year, 
will absorb around seventy million tons of carbon dioxide in the pe-
riod from 2008 to 2012.259 
 Though carbon sinks seem promising, in a report published by 
the U.K. Royal Society, scientists warned that carbon sinks are not a 
long-term substitute for emissions cuts.260 Professor David Read, chair 
of the report, warned that “the size of the potential sinks is quite 
modest,” and as such, they would “all be used up in a few decades.”261 
Read also argued that rising global temperatures could make bacteria 
more active, which will break down carbon faster.262 Other scientific 
studies suggest that carbon sinks cannot possibly keep up with rising 
carbon emissions.263 A Princeton-led study found that in the United 
States alone, forests and soil absorb from one-third to two-thirds of a 
billion tons of carbon each year (an amount that surprised many of 
the participating scientists), yet U.S. carbon emissions are up to four 
times that amount, indicating the need for actual emissions cuts.264 A 
spokesperson for the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment stated 
that Norway would probably not use carbon sinks to reach its targets, 
because Norway is “concerned with real qualitative emissions reduc-
tions, not fictitious ones that are just on paper.”265 
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B. Emissions Permit Trading Schemes 
1. In General 
 The most commonly implemented form of emissions trading is a 
cap-and-trade system.266 Under a cap-and-trade scheme, regulators 
first set emission reduction goals and then, from this figure, establish 
a cap on total emissions. Regulators then allocate a fixed number of 
allowances to participants, each allowance representing a specific au-
thorization to pollute (e.g. one ton).267 These allowances are often 
referred to as rights-to-pollute or credits. The regulatory authority 
monitors participants closely and at the end of the compliance period 
participants must have a sufficient number of allowances to cover 
their pollution for that period.268 Participants anticipating a shortfall 
in allowances at the end of the compliance period can buy additional 
allowances from participants holding excess allowances. Unlike tradi-
tional CAC systems, individual control requirements are not set for 
specific sources, making the trading scheme more flexible for indus-
try.269 
2. U.S. Success with Permit Trading 
 The EPA first applied the concept of emissions permit trading in 
the United States in the mid-1970s. Notably, the Agency based the 
original model on an interpretation of the Clean Air Act, not on spe-
cific statutory authority.270 At the time, the EPA viewed permit trading 
as a sensible model for preventing air quality from worsening. Under 
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the aptly named Emissions Trading Program (ETP), new entrants to 
the market were required to purchase credits from already existing 
industry members.271 Building on the ETP’s success, Congress, under 
the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, specifically authorized a variety 
of emissions trading schemes, including the Acid Rain Program.272 
 The Acid Rain Program is perhaps the best-known trading suc-
cess story out of the United States. In the 1970s, emissions of sulfur 
dioxide, the leading component of acid rain, posed a serious threat to 
U.S. fish, water supplies, and was a known cause of respiratory disease. 
Under the 1977 Clean Air Act, regulators commanded polluters to 
affix a “scrubber” to factory stacks, to strip out sulfur dioxide emis-
sions.273 Economists estimated that it would cost industry ten billion 
dollars each year to comply with traditional CAC regulation, such as 
the “scrubber” solution, to deal with acid rain.274 
  Congress instead gave polluters more flexibility with the 1990 
Amendments.275 The cap-and-trade program gave polluters a limited 
number of emissions allowances that polluters were allowed to sell.276 
In the end, the cost of cleaning up sulfur dioxide in the United States is 
about one billion dollars per year.277 Partial credit should be given to 
the flexibility of the cap-and-trade scheme.278 The start of the Acid Rain 
Program in 1995 also lowered sulfur dioxide emission levels from the 
power sector and has contributed to significant improvements in air 
quality and public heath.279 
 Apart from the Acid Rain Program, the United States has imple-
mented a number of other successful trading schemes on a national 
level, including CFC and halon trading.280 In 2006, the EPA proposed 
cap-and-trade rules to address mercury, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen 
oxide emissions. Under the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), the 
EPA plans to “permanently cap and reduce mercury emissions from 
coal-fired power plants.”281 If implemented, the United States would be 
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the first country in the world to regulate mercury admissions.282 The 
partner to CAMR is the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which aims 
to permanently cap emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides in 
the eastern United States.283 Both cap-and-trade schemes allow states to 
administer the plans, determine their own caps on emissions, and de-
velop their own system of distributing allowances.284 Each state’s plan is 
subject to the approval of the EPA.285 
 Environmentalists have accused the EPA of caving to political 
pressure and abandoning its initial position in favor of traditional 
CAC regulation for mercury pollution.286 The EPA originally favored 
a law requiring utility coal-fired power plants to install controls to 
scrub off as much mercury as possible before it could be released into 
the air.287 Environmentalists contend, and the EPA’s own studies sug-
gest, that trading schemes can result in “hotspots” or pockets of pollu-
tion around companies that purchase excess allowances. Still, the EPA 
says it now favors the proposed trading scheme, the alternative fa-
vored by the Bush Administration and industry, in cleaning up mer-
cury.288 Despite the presumed compromise, neither CAMR nor CAIR 
have been implemented.289 
 A number of U.S. States have successfully implemented emissions 
trading schemes. For example, in 1994, California initiated the Re-
gional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program to curb nitro-
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gen oxides and sulfur oxides (contributors to smog) in the Los Angeles 
Basin.290 RECLAIM covers a range of industries and its diverse partici-
pants include “refineries, power plants, cement kilns, aerospace, food 
manufacturing, textiles, metal melting, hotels, and even amusement 
parks.”291 RECLAIM replaced thirty-two command-and-control rules.292 
According to the EPA, the RECLAIM program improves air quality, de-
spite the lower than expected market price for emissions credits.293 
Other States with trading schemes include Illinois, Michigan, Pennsyl-
vania, Colorado, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington.294 
 In the United States, trading schemes have also developed re-
gionally. For instance, several Northeast States developed the Budget 
Trading Program (BTP) of the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC), 
a cap-and-trade program, aimed at reducing summertime nitrogen 
oxide emissions.295 The BTP actively traded from 1999 to 2002, when 
it was replaced by the current SIP Call.296 
 Surprisingly, private U.S. companies have also developed emis-
sions trading schemes without the heavy-hand of government. The 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is a voluntary, legally binding GHG 
emissions trading scheme in North America.297 Twenty-eight compa-
nies, including the Ford Motor Company and DuPont, developed the 
CCX in conjunction with the cities of Chicago and Mexico City.298 
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Members made modest pledges to reduce GHG emissions by two per-
cent from 1999 levels in 2002 and by an additional one percent per 
year for the period from 2003 to 2006.299 The decision by corporate 
business to form the CCX probably had a lot to do with the anticipa-
tion of future government-imposed emissions restrictions, and a lot 
less to do with being good global citizens.300 Thus, with the subse-
quent U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol it remains to be seen 
whether U.S. corporate business will continue to develop and volun-
tarily participate in such schemes. 
3. EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Directive 2003/87) 
 Following the Council’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, 
the European Parliament and Council enacted Directive 2003/87 in 
2003.301 Directive 2003/87, the “Emissions Trading Directive,” estab-
lishes a scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the EC 
Community.302 Under the Emissions Trading Directive, each Member 
State must develop a National Allocation Plan (NAP) for GHG emis-
sion allowances, within the parameters set by the Directive.303 
 Initially, the scheme “covers only carbon dioxide emissions from 
installations in five sectors (power, oil, steel, minerals, and pulp and 
paper).”304 While Members States are allowed to devise their own 
schemes as set forth in their NAP, each plan is subject to the Commis-
sion’s approval, similar to the U.S. CAMR and CAIR programs. For 
instance, each Member State determines the total quantity of allow-
ances it intends to allocate, and precisely how it plans to allocate 
them. An important aspect in the success of an emissions trading 
scheme is the level of scrutiny the acting authority has in approving 
                                                                                                                      
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 See generally Council Directive 87/EC, supra note 163; see also U.K. Department for En-
vironment, Food and Rural Affairs—European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, http:// 
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/eu/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) [here- 
inafter DEFRA]. 
302 See generally Council Directive 87/EC, supra note 162. Directive 2004/101, called the 
Linking Directive, amends the Emissions Trading Directive to “enable Member States to 
allow operators to use credits obtained through Kyoto mechanisms (certified emissions 
reductions and emissions reduction units) to comply with their obligations” under the 
Emissions Trading Directive. Council Directive 2004/101, ¶ 2, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18 (EU). 
303 Council Directive 87/EC, supra note 162, at 35–6, art. 9. 
304 Andrew G. Thompson, Australia and an Emissions Trading Market—Opportunities, 
Costs and Legal Frameworks, 4 Int’l Energy L. & Tax’n Rev. 79, 81 (2005). “Combustion 
installations over 20MW [megawatts] capacity in other sectors are also included. Other 
sectors and other gases may be included from 2006.” Id. 
2007] Climate Change and Tax Policy 453
  
and monitoring plans.305 The Commission must approve the NAPs 
submitted by Member States, though it is debatable whether the 
Commission has committed the necessary resources to evaluate ade-
quately whether the programs will actually work.306 
 Economists have criticized the EU Trading Scheme as “almost 
worthless” because Member States, in caving to industry, have issued 
too many allowances.307 Michael Grubb, an expert economist in cli-
mate change, agrees with this grim outlook and believes “[t]here will 
be very few buyers [of allowances] and prices will fall through the 
floor.”308 For example, a report by the U.K. Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) suggests that the original fig-
ure of 736 million tons of carbon dioxide, submitted by the United 
Kingdom in its NAP, would only have required industry to reduce 
emissions by less than one percent.309 To make matters worse, indus-
try successfully lobbied the U.K. Government and the figure was in-
creased to 756 million tons of carbon dioxide in an amendment to its 
NAP.310 While this figure has met resistance by the Commission, it 
provides an example of a Member State willing to do the paperwork 
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for the EU Trading Scheme, but unwilling to do the hard work in 
curbing carbon emissions. 
 Other experts have criticized the Emissions Trading Scheme for its 
limited scope. The current scheme covers emissions only until 2007. 
Further, the Scheme only addresses about half of the carbon emitted in 
the European Union because it does not address emissions from vehi-
cles.311 Finally, not all countries of the European Union have joined: 
Poland, Italy, the Czech Republic, and Greece failed to submit alloca-
tion plans in time.312 
VI. Deciding Between Green Taxation and Emissions Trading 
A. The Case for Permit Trading over Green Taxation in  
Lowering Carbon Emissions 
 Permit trading can oftentimes be politically achievable when in-
dustry interests have stalled green taxation. In some cases, the imple-
mentation of an environmental tax will involve enormous increases in 
costs to industrial polluters. 313 Therefore, these polluters will expend 
large sums of money lobbying politicians to reject the tax and put in 
its place a trading scheme. 
 Politicians must also answer to their constituents. Taxes can be ex-
tremely hard to sell to voters, especially outside of Northern Europe. 
Indeed, most policymakers have accepted that economic models prom-
ising to rid countries of unemployment and the like through the appli-
cation of a green tax simply could not work in the real world.314 Even in 
Northern Europe, taxes could not be set high enough to achieve such 
lofty goals.315 In the case of the European Union, its own structure in-
hibits the implementation of a common carbon tax because it requires 
unanimity for fiscal measures.316 Countries such as the United King-
dom have stood firm against a common carbon tax.317 In contrast, a 
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permit market is not fiscal in nature and may thus be passed by major-
ity rule.318 
 Whereas the idea of permit markets may be more politically at-
tainable than green taxes, getting these markets off the ground can 
be a political struggle.319 It is often difficult to gain agreement on the 
distribution of the initial assignment. For example, the EPA has yet to 
get political and industry agreement to implement the CAMR and 
CAIR trading programs.320 
 Permit trading is also more economically feasible for industry than 
green taxation. Even the most devout environmentalists must acknowl-
edge the potential for economic damage as a result of ill-conceived 
green taxes.321 Trading schemes provide greater flexibility for industry 
than green taxes and the market, rather than a government agency, is 
better able to determine the cost of cleaning up GHGs under emissions 
trading schemes.322 Conceptually, trading schemes should be more 
economically efficient than green taxes. 
 Governments, like industry, are also concerned about maintain-
ing industrial competitiveness in the world market, and thus, may fa-
vor trading schemes.323 For instance, the United States and Australia 
unapologetically withdrew their support for the Kyoto Protocol citing 
their concern that binding emissions cuts would hinder competitive-
ness.324 Many politicians fear green taxes will similarly impede indus-
try and hamper their own political ambitions.325 In contrast, permit 
trading schemes are more flexible and allow industry a greater oppor-
tunity to mitigate loss.326 Less cost to national industry means it can 
maintain its position on the global market. 
 Permit trading systems may also induce reluctant members 
through the application of grandfathered schemes. A grandfathered 
permit market builds on historical emission levels and the status quo, 
thus assuring current members of the market an advantage over new 
entrants.327 GHG emissions do not abide by human borders; there-
fore, countries that continue to do business as usual can benefit from 
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the decrease in GHG emissions elsewhere (i.e. become “free rid-
ers”).328 Inducing reluctant international members to join the scheme 
may mean the permit market can mitigate the free-rider problem. 
 On a more cynical note, industries may be more likely to comply 
with permit trading schemes. Green taxes, like most taxes, encourage 
creativity on behalf of taxpayers. For instance, due to the high carbon 
tax in Norway, Statoil, an integrated oil and gas company, has devel-
oped a process to divert its carbon emissions into a large aquifer under 
the North Sea.329 The most liberal estimates suggest that this layer of 
permeable sandstone rock may be able to store carbon for several hun-
dred years.330 However, even if these optimistic projections are true, 
this process only delays the inevitable release of carbon emissions into 
the atmosphere. Storing carbon and hoping that future generations 
develop the means to ameliorate the problem is not sound environ-
mental policy. Though Norwegian policymakers probably did not ex-
pect to encourage such activities, this result is the risk run by imple-
menting any form of green tax. 
 This is not to insinuate that the possibility of tax planning or tax 
avoidance should nullify the use of a carbon taxes. The likelihood 
that more companies will follow the example of Statoil, however, sug-
gests two important policy ideas. First, drafters of a carbon tax should 
be aware of such technological developments and need to determine 
if such developments should be addressed.331 Second, taxpayers will 
inevitably try to avoid taxation, which may be one reason for choosing 
a permit scheme in addressing GHG emissions.332 
 In implementing a trading scheme, the environmental authority 
will first determine the maximum amount of allowable emissions for 
the year. Then the authority allocates the corresponding number of 
permits to the trading participants (e.g. one ton per allowance). If a 
participant does not have enough permits to cover its emissions at the 
end of the trading period, the participant will be charged with a steep 
fine and potentially face other consequences. Assuming these conse-
quences are stiff enough to be an adequate deterrent, the target set 
by the authority should be closely tied to the actual emissions in that 
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period.333 In this respect, the permit trading scheme has a similar ef-
fect to traditional CAC regulation, although a closely monitored CAC 
rule may come even closer to the target.334 
 In contrast, a tax on emissions is relatively poor at producing the 
target level of pollution.335 Taxes on GHG emissions provide a price 
incentive for industry to decrease polluting, but it can be extremely 
difficult for the environmental authority to anticipate the reaction by 
industry.336 In some cases, the tax may be too low, and thus emissions 
levels may not improve much at all. 
 Taxes require a trial-and-error process and can require costly read-
justments.337 The charging authority may require years to determine 
where the GHG is most efficient. Administrative costs, not to mention 
the economic and environmental costs, can be large. Additionally, 
complications inevitably arise due to price inflation and economic 
growth.338 Thus, the tax will always require readjustments. 
B. The Case for Green Taxation over Permit Trading in  
Lowering Carbon Emissions 
 While green taxation can provide government with a revenue 
source, the amount of revenue will be a function of the level of tax and 
administrative costs.339 The days of the golden double dividend appear 
to be gone. Economic models suggesting governments could eradicate 
unemployment with sufficient green taxes did not stand up in the real 
world.340 That said, existing green tax regimes suggest it is entirely pos-
sible to simultaneously reduce other “bad” taxes.341 Also, governments 
may choose to recycle some tax revenue back into environmental pro-
jects.342 Such systems reflect sound policy choices because, in essence, 
the environment receives a double dividend. Naturally, government 
must spend sufficient resources in determining the appropriate level of 
tax and where to appropriate any resulting revenue. In some cases, ad-
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ministrative costs can be greater than the tax assessed and thus provide 
a negative source of revenue, a result to be avoided. 
 Since permit trading schemes allow polluters to purchase extra 
allowances, some polluters will continue doing business as usual. As 
such, environmentalists criticize some trading schemes for creating 
“hotspots” (areas in which GHG emissions remain strong).343 For in-
stance, environmental groups have called for stringent mercury regu-
lation in the United States and have argued that mercury is too great 
a health hazard to be an appropriate candidate for market-based 
regulation, which can result in uneven enforcement and protect some 
populations more than others.344 
 Taxation on GHGs is also market-based and simply provides a 
price incentive for firms to decrease GHG emission and can, theoreti-
cally, result in hotspots.345 Recent studies suggest permit trading 
schemes are more likely culprits. Grandfathered permit schemes are 
especially likely to create this negative public health effect because 
entrenched industry is favored and thus may be allocated enough 
permits to cover its prior emissions levels. These established industries 
are also quite likely to reside in the same geographical area for rea-
sons having to do with available resources or the history of develop-
ment. Further scientific discovery will answer whether carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases lead to such hotspots. 
 Carbon taxation may also make more sense in economic terms 
than the alternative permit trading system. There is enormous uncer-
tainty regarding the costs and benefits of carbon abatement and, there-
fore, “it can make a big difference whether you regulate by quantity 
(that is, caps) or with price (that is, with taxes).”346 Economists argue 
that the per-unit benefits of carbon abatement change little relative to 
the amount of the overall carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere.347 
Conversely, the per-unit costs to factories and utilities change a lot.348 
Therefore, economists reason the tax is preferable to a trading system 
because the tax, theoretically, can be set at a rate that can never greatly 
exceed the benefits.349 (Extensive research would be required to 
achieve the correct tax rate.) The trading system, on the other hand, 
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depends on a volatile market with much less certainty.350 In other 
words, “a reasonable carbon tax would never impose unreasonable 
costs on the reduction of carbon emissions, but a quantity target 
could”351 and “preserving the cap at all costs is simply not worth it.”352 
 Carbon taxes also have the ability to reduce other taxes.353 Theo-
retically, the permit trading system may also raise revenue which may 
in turn be used to reduce bad taxes. In practice, governments simply 
give away permits to polluters, raising no public revenue.354 Moreover, 
while both carbon taxes and permit trading systems carry administra-
tive burden, the permit market may turn out to be more costly be-
cause of the need to develop a complex secondary market.355 For ex-
ample, hiring brokers and developing expertise in the secondary 
permit market is expensive.356 
 Finally, fairness should be considered. Getting industry-wide 
agreement on the “fair” allocation of permits can be especially difficult, 
perhaps impossible.357 In grandfathered permit schemes, emissions al-
locations are normally determined as a percentage of historical emis-
sions.358 However, companies that reduced emissions prior to the base 
year or companies rapidly growing will inevitable get the short end of 
the stick compared to entrenched large polluters.359 As such, the car-
bon tax may be across the board “fairer.” 
C. Carbon Taxations Is Preferable to Permit Trading 
 Policy choices regarding carbon emissions are not simple. The 
meeting of politics, science, economics, and moral choice will always 
lead to lively discussion. Indeed, climate change and what to do about 
it has leapt from scholarly journals and now entered our everyday con-
versations, for good reason. Now the tough choices have to be made. 
With what we know today, carbon taxation is the superior form of car-
bon abatement. On balance, carbon taxation provides greater price 
certainty to industry, is simpler to implement, produces the greatest 
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chance of reducing bad taxes, and is arguable fairer to all types of pol-
luters than the alternative permit trading scheme. 
Conclusion 
 Mounting scientific evidence suggests that man-made GHG emis-
sions (especially carbon dioxide emissions) are a contributing factor to 
global climate change. In economic terms, pollution is a negative ex-
ternality that the market itself cannot correct. As such, governments 
have traditionally used CAC regulation to control emissions. CAC regu-
lation is effective in controlling emissions as it requires each polluter to 
reduce GHG emissions, for example, by forcing polluters to install 
scrubbers to industrial stacks to remove pollutants. Unsurprisingly, this 
heavy-handed approach has proved unpopular with industry due to its 
inherent inflexibility. 
 Green taxation and emissions trading schemes, on the other 
hand, provide economic incentives for polluters to reduce emissions. 
As such, these EIs do not demand each polluter reduce emissions, but 
rather aim to reduce overall GHG emissions. Green taxation provides 
a price incentive for polluters to curb GHG emissions. However, green 
taxation may be ineffective in curbing GHG emissions if the tax is set 
too low or exempts large sectors of industry. Taxes set too low become 
mere revenue raising mechanisms at best. Exempting large polluters 
abandons the “polluter pays principle” and can have little effect in 
curbing GHG emissions. 
 Alternatively, permit trading schemes have been successfully im-
plemented in the United States and have proven effective in curbing 
sulfur dioxide emissions, for one. While these markets are often sup-
ported by industry policymakers should consider the superiority of 
green taxation. A detailed analysis of both the theoretical and practical 
arguments regarding carbon taxation and alternative emissions permit 
trading scheme shows that carbon taxation is the superior method of 
carbon abatement. While taxes are often politically unfavorable, espe-
cially in the United States, our discussion should not stop there. If 
sound policy reasons in favor of a carbon tax cannot win over politi-
cians and voters perhaps the U.S. and other countries could follow in 
the footsteps of the U.K.—simply change the name. “Levy,” for some 
reason, has a better political ring than “tax.” 
